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Abstract
A current body of research examines Colombia’s judicial institutions and focuses on the
successes and failures of past reforms. While the literature is overwhelmingly negative, scholars
have managed to put forward pieces of a potential solution. I draw on these analyses to answer
the question, “what is the best possible course of action for Colombia’s future judicial reform
projects?” Throughout this paper, I draw on Colombian newspapers, think-tank reports, survey
research, and academic studies to formulate a cohesive answer. This existing literature identifies
that Colombia’s weak judiciary stems from Spanish colonialism’s lasting influence, the reactive
and defensive nature of judges, and persistent political instability. While past reforms have
addressed general problems within the nation, I find that Colombia could benefit from a
targeted, phased reform agenda. I conclude Colombia’s judiciary needs a serious round of
comprehensive reforms to address its lack of competence, accountability, and transparency.
Moreover, future reforms could benefit from a reformed budget and increased civil society
participation. These adjustments could then facilitate public trust in the government, thus
propelling its legitimacy.
Lay Summary
Since the 1980s, numerous Latin American countries have initiated difficult and lengthy
processes of democratic transition. While some have introduced sweeping reforms to address
serious problems within their justice systems, governments still struggle to administer justice
efficiently. Despite the newly drafted constitutions aiming to guarantee the protection of citizens'
rights, there is a significant gap between constitutional promises and the actual behavior of
judicial officials. Citizens suffer from this failure of justice the most, as they routinely encounter
widespread corruption, inefficiency, and apathy from their government officials. Nowhere is the
corruption, inefficiency, and apathy greater than in Colombia. My thesis will explore the past
and present judicial reform attempts in Colombia. I will closely analyze how historical and
institutional factors have played a central role in the country’s attempt at reform. I will also
examine the introduction of the Constitutional Court, its strengths and weaknesses, the general
failure of reforms, and the ongoing debates in Colombia regarding the proper path toward
reform. Finally, I propose a series of reforms that the Colombian government could take to
address the system's most serious and challenging problems.

I.

Introduction

Since it gained its independence from Spain more than two centuries ago, Colombia has
attempted to create a genuinely democratic government. In the mid-nineteenth century, two
powerful political parties, the Conservatives and the Liberals, gained control over Colombia’s
political institutions1 and controlled politics in the country for the next 150 years. In the 1940s,
an intense feud developed between these two parties that triggered La Violencia, a civil war that
lasted for almost two decades and took the lives of more than 200,000 people. After a short
period of relative peace in the early 1970s, groups not allied with either of the two dominant
parties found themselves excluded and marginalized, as widespread protests led to another round
of violent uprisings.
Adding to this chaos, two violent groups challenged the government further. First,
paramilitary groups, allied with political elites, launched violent assaults against the left-wing
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which had been mounting violent upheaval
since the 1960s. At the same time, the Colombian state confronted a vicious war with organized
crime, in particular, with the large drug-trafficking cartels. The U.S. consumer demand for
cocaine had skyrocketed, and the Colombian cartels moved quickly. They paid local farmers to
grow coca in the Andean mountains, process the coca into cocaine paste, and trans-ship it into
the U.S. to sell at high prices. The turf wars and competition associated with the trafficking
networks led to record-breaking crime rates and widespread violence across the country. Both
the cartels and the insurgents carried out regular attacks on infrastructure, civil society,
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politicians, political institutions, journalists, and business elites. This led to the death of
thousands of social activists, journalists, politicians, judicial officials, and law enforcement
officers.2 Through the 1980s, tens of thousands of Colombian citizens lost their lives, and people
in marginalized communities lost any chance at claiming their civil and political rights. Medellin
became the murder capital of the world. In 1990, 6349 people were murdered in the city. This is
equivalent to 380 deaths per 100,000 people.3 Scholars and journalists routinely referred to the
country as a “failed state.”4
Starting in the early 1990s, a combination of regional cooperation, enhanced lawenforcement techniques, and markedly increased domestic and international funding diminished
the power of first, the Medellín Cartel, and then of the Cali Cartel. In 1993, the Colombian
military, alongside the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) killed the leader of the
Medellín Cartel, Pablo Escobar. By 2006, the brothers who headed the Cali Cartel, Miguel
Rodríguez Orejuela and Gilberto Rodríguez Orejuela, were arrested, convicted, and given 30year sentences. These two major events shifted the leading international criminal networks’
center of operations from Colombia to Mexico. This also initiated a new era in Colombian
history with markedly less drug-related violence.
Nevertheless, FARC continued to wreak havoc in the country. By 1999, its membership
had burgeoned to more than 18,000 members, and its violent attacks continued. The organization
carried out more than 3000 kidnappings that year. In response, nearly a quarter of the Colombian
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population launched a massive strike across the country, calling for an end to the violence.5 The
“No Más” (“no more”) protests helped bring the FARC to the negotiation table with the
Colombian government. Although, it took another 17 years before FARC and the Colombian
government signed a peace accord. By the late 1990s, the violence finally started to subside.
Beginning in the late 1990s, the Colombian government, like many other governments across the
region, took significant steps to create a more open, accountable democratic state with a fair
system of justice. Its first order of business was to write a new constitution.
This thesis examines Colombia’s judicial reforms that resulted in the creation of a
Constitutional Court, formed primarily to focus on the rights and grievances of marginalized
citizens. It first explores the process of designing a new constitution that showcased this new
court and the obstacles that the architects of this document confronted. Second, it analyzes the
performance of the Colombian courts, assessing both successes and failures. Third, it identifies
lessons learned based on scholarly analyses of the effectiveness of these Colombian reforms.
Finally, it proposes further reforms that Colombia might find valuable. I conclude Colombia
could benefit if it were to implement specific phases of judicial reform, rather than broad
programs that simultaneously target multiple areas of concern.

II.

History of Colombia’s Attempts to Establish Constitutional Government

David Rampf and Diana Chavarro, “The 1991 Colombian National Constituent Assembly: Turning Exclusion into
Inclusion, or a Vain Endeavour?,” Inclusive Political Settlements Paper 1, (2014): 5,
https://www.academia.edu/12650689/The_1991_Colombian_National_Constituent_Assembly_Turning_Exclusion_i
nto_Inclusion_or_a_Vain_Endeavour.
5

Colombia is no stranger to political instability, as it has implemented 13 constitutions
since it declared its independence from Spain in 1810.6 Creating a workable model has never
been easy, as the country’s struggle to form an effective and just judicial process continues
today. The country’s founding fathers, who called their country Nueva Granada, adopted the
liberal and democratic model based on that of France and the United States. The leaders of this
new country argued over whether to create a centralized unitary government like that of France,
or a federal union of territories like that of the U.S. Different perspectives eventually resulted in
a compromise that adopted concepts from both models. The founders of Colombia modeled their
bill of rights after that of France. The written constitution, which created a presidential system
and an independent judicial structure, resembled that of the U.S. Scholars have argued, however,
that a set of unwritten assumptions embedded in the U.S. Constitution were lost in translation,
resulting in a less-flexible and overly strict implementation of the law in new Colombia.7
Like all Latin American countries, Colombia’s efforts to create a democratic government
were hampered by its strong Spanish influences. Scholars generally agree that the economic,
political, and cultural institutions and traditions inherited from Spain’s colonial domination
remained deeply embedded.8 Political scientists argue good government creates “functioning
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legal and judicial institutions to accomplish the interrelated goals of promoting private sector
development, encouraging the development of all other societal institutions, alleviating poverty,
and consolidating democracy.” 9 As Luz Estella Nagle has argued, scholars emphasize judicial
institutions because they provide the structures and procedures that ensure the proper functioning
of institutions, and play a critical role in transforming ideas for reform into reality.10 However,
the Colombian judicial branch has clearly failed to ensure justice to offer redress for legitimate
grievances, to remain accessible and responsive, and to protect the rights of Colombian citizens.
The legacy of Colombia's colonial past is partly to blame for several reasons. First, Spain granted
minimal self-rule to its colonies. When the crown made decisions, the provisional governors, or
members of the crown's "Council," enforced them. Members of the Council held absolute
executive and judicial authority over all matters. Executive and judicial power remained fully
intertwined. Many judicial decisions were thus products of political considerations. As a result,
citizens thoroughly distrusted judicial outcomes. Once the region’s countries gained
independence, power was transferred into the hands of local caudillos (strongmen) or small
groups of military leaders (juntas). The courts then became instruments of the rulers used to
enforce the ruling elite’s authority.11 Even as some Latin American countries adopted a more
American-style separation-of-powers doctrine, judges remained powerless and controlled by the
political elites.
Today, the judiciary continues to suffer from a systemic lack of respect across the region.
Colombia, like many countries in the region, remained susceptible to the will of the legislative
and executive branches for many years. As the judiciary feared reprisal from the other branches
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and the authority of the Catholic Church during Spanish colonialism, it generally remains subject
to the will of those in power in two important ways. First, it has been subject to legislative and
executive political ambition and corruption. Judicial officials have often been the target of
violent acts of intimidation, as the Colombian government has generally failed to ensure the
safety and security of its judicial officers. Second, other branches have regularly made the
judiciary the scapegoat for the wrongs committed in the country. The judicial branch has
consequently been forced to assume a purely defensive role regarding other major political
actors. The judiciary has "long been little more than a maidservant, a Cinderella, to the other
branches of government."12 Consequently, throughout Latin America, the judicial systems have
been politically manipulated, corrupted, underfunded, understaffed, under-trained, and incapable
of ensuring justice and protecting the rights of citizens.
In the 1980s, numerous Latin American governments moved to initiate democratic
transitions. As the countries fell deeply into debt, and their militaries began to exit from power,
the transitions were officially initiated. Further, a combination of internal and external pressures,
especially from international financial lending institutions, brought about a reorganizing of
government institutions and priorities. In many cases, the first order of business was to
restructure the judicial system to make it more engaged and protective of the citizens’ rights.13
Many of the transitioning states across the region, including Chile, Argentina, Brazil, and
Uruguay, created new constitutions that would help move the process forward.

III.

The Colombian Constitution and the Constitutional Court
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In the early 1990s, Colombia began its own complex process of reform. The government
first established a constituent-assembly to draft a new constitution with stronger and more
transparent democratic institutions. The assembly included representatives from various political
parties, former guerrillas, various religious and indigenous groups, and legislatures.14 The
members of the assembly debated whether the country needed a constitutional court, an
important question. Proponents of the court argued that despite the many fleeting constitutions,
most of them failed to protect the rights of citizens who lack the protection of a trusted court
system. Some assembly members, however, feared that having a powerful constitutional court
would lead to a “government of judges,” in which judges would increasingly take on the role of
the legislature. The proponents responded that the court was essential to address social and
ethical questions regarding the protection of rights, and not political ones. Both sides eventually
agreed the new court must remain autonomous and non-politicized.
In 1991, the assembly created the Constitutional Court of Colombia, the highest and final
appellate court in the country’s court hierarchy. Its primary function was to decide the
constitutionality of laws, acts, and statutes. It was also given an innovative provision, called the
tutela. The Court, located in Bogotá, held its first session in March of 1992. Nine magistrates,
each of whom can serve only a single term for eight years, are chosen by the Colombian Senate.
Colombia’s extensive judicial reforms have received praise from legal experts. The
creation of the Constitutional Court, in particular, has strengthened socially and politically
marginalized citizens’ ability to claim their constitutionally protected rights. The Court has since
enhanced judicial independence, instituted rules that require no attorney fees or general
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payments, simplified filing procedures, and employed additional magistrates and court personnel
to move through caseloads quickly. The Court, housed in modern, technologically advanced
facilities, offers regular programs for citizens to inform them of both the complaint-filing process
and of their rights requiring protection, at all times.15
Though Colombia stands as an effective model for other regional efforts of judicial
reform, the country’s new approach has confronted serious challenges. For example, some
complain that with the introduction of the Constitutional Court, judges from the other ranking
courts have become complacent, more supportive of the status quo, and resistant to change.16
This “push-back” has created an internal power struggle within the judicial branch. Others have
complained that the Colombian Constitutional Court has accrued too much power, and the entire
political system now suffers from “judicialization.” Judicialization is a social-science term
referring to the overreach of the judicial branch. Rodrigo Yepes defined the term in the following
manner: “matters traditionally decided through political channels are now increasingly being
decided by judges.”17 He concluded the Colombian judiciary has managed to isolate itself from
the other branches of government and now functions with nearly full autonomy. Given the level
of corruption and mismanagement in the executive and legislative branches, Yepes
conceptualized Colombia as an example of judicialization, at least in comparison with other
developing countries.18
In Colombia, judges are generally viewed as being slightly more transparent and less
vulnerable to corruption than the officials in other branches. This has resulted, however, in
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profound tension between judges and other government officials. Judges now often find
themselves pitted against the members of the other political branches and are consequently
perceived as more democratic. This development has led to a paradoxical shift in democratic
legitimacy from the political system to the judicial system, as the elected representatives are the
least trusted. As citizens view the judiciary as more accessible and transparent, increasing
demands are formulated in legal and judicial terms. Some of the most prominent forms of
judicialization have included efforts to counter political corruption, to manage economic policy,
and to protect minority groups, individual autonomy, and stigmatized populations. Unlike other
scholars, Yepes sees the increasing participation of social actors and citizens as a consequence of
judicialization, not as a necessary condition to propel it.19

IV. The Constitutional Court and Tutelas

The designers of the Colombian Constitution expanded the scope for written protections
of fundamental, individual rights. Before 1991, the judiciary consisted of three primary judicial
organs – the Supreme Court, the Council of State, and the Superior Judicial Council. The
tripartite structure often clashed, causing internal confusion and subjecting the Colombian people
to unaddressed and often ignored human-rights violations. For example, the three highest courts
consistently refused to protect the rights of its LGBTQ citizens,20 primarily because the
Colombian state had not yet recognized this group as one in need of protection. The
Constitutional Court was specifically tasked to address the grievances of marginalized and often
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unrecognized minority-groups. Since this court is less formal than the others, it provides lowcost access to the court system for average citizens. Constitutional protections in this court are
usually afforded through individual tutelas, a revolutionary addition to the Colombian justice
system.21
A tutela is an immediate court action that can be requested if an individual feels his or
her constitutional rights are being violated, especially if no legal alternative exists for the
individual to pursue.22 Tutela cases grant easy access to justice and require no legal fees or
lawyers. Within a few years, the ease of access to a Constitutional Court decision had resulted in
soaring demand for tutela protections. While the Court chooses which of the tutela cases it
wishes to examine, the judges only have ten days to render a decision once it is selected. These
cases typically take precedent over all of the judges' other casework, creating a severe delay in
other case decisions and a significant backload regarding other constitutional matters.23 The new
category of fast-track cases has resulted in a seriously overloaded and increasingly ineffectual
court system.

V. Plan Colombia

In the 1980s and 1990s, FARC continued to undermine Colombia’s rule of law and to
pose a much broader geopolitical threat. In 2000, the U.S. consequently launched the partnership
known as “Plan Colombia.” The plan was a multilateral developmental effort, framed by the
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government as an ambitious proposal that would address the multitude of problems that had
undermined Colombia’s political and economic development for decades. The plan sought to
promote the nation’s economic growth, train law enforcement, combat the spread of narcotics,
and strengthen judicial institutions.24 Plan Colombia significantly reduced violence within the
nation for a time. Homicides declined by 50%, while kidnappings declined by 90%. Colombia
also became a model for police officer training, as it established the protocol for 21 other Latin
American and African countries.25 Notably, the U.S. agreed to commit $1.3 billion of the $7.5
billion dedicated to the plan. Yet, its contribution was mostly via military assistance. A group of
European states also contributed $1 billion to the institutional components of the plan. Though
Colombia technically committed to providing the remaining sum, its actual budget fell far short.
Further, little attention was allocated to improving the country’s judicial institutions. Any
positive benefits have simply followed from the plan’s other priorities, such as combatting the
spread of narcotics.26 While this was great news, marginalized communities continued to suffer
from a lack of legal and social protections.

VI. The 2012 Judicial Reform Bill

In 2012, the Colombian Congress passed a contentious judicial-reform bill. While the bill
introduced some potentially beneficial changes, it primarily protected criminal public officials.
On the one hand, the bill granted the Constitutional Court decision-making authority regarding
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constitutional protections. This measure sought to prevent clashes among the highest courts over
case outcomes. On the other hand, Congress slipped in an additional provision to reduce overall
judicial power, as it granted the legislative and executive branches immunity from a guilty courtconviction. Standing law allowed the Supreme Court to investigate and prosecute congressmen
and congresswomen who had been indicted for illegal activity, such as collaborating with
unlawful paramilitary groups. Under the proposed bill, the 1,300 open investigations of highranking government officials facing conviction were to be halted. Rather than propelling
government transparency, the proposed bill simply created more controversy. Wisely, President
Juan Manuel Santos rejected the bill and sent it back to Congress for review.27

VII. The Peace Agreement with FARC

Although President Santos rejected the 2012 bill, members of Congress continued to
contribute to insurgent groups. The door to further corruption within the Colombian government
was consequently left wide open. For the next four years, no official efforts were made for
judicial reform, and the domestic insurgency continued. However, in 2016, the government
signed a historic peace agreement with the Revolutionary Armed Forced of Colombia (FARC) to
end the 52-year armed conflict.28 The peace agreement has served numerous positive benefits for
the country. First, it has minimized congressional support and collaboration with insurgent
groups.29 Second, it has opened up civic life, as violence has dropped significantly since 2016.
Third, it has allowed more opportunities for citizens to pay attention to corruption scandals. The
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increasing attention to political affairs has since initiated massive public protests in response to
government injustices. It is also safer to protest now because paramilitary groups do not openly
target grass-roots social movements as they did before the agreement.30

VIII. The National Development Plan
In 2019, three years after the signing of the peace accord with FARC, Colombia’s current
President, Ivan Duque, launched his National Development Plan (PND). The $325 billion socioeconomic spending plan set the administration’s lofty goals of enhanced education, higher
employment, more human and economic security, and environmental sustainability. The
government argued this new plan would pave the way for lasting national peace through a simple
formula: rule of law + entrepreneurship = equality.31 While the plan addresses several critical
areas in need of improvement, it neglects to commit any resources to judicial reform. It certainly
emphasizes a more transparent and efficient state, but it only targets a few individual protection
agendas. For example, President Duque failed to carry out highly-anticipated reforms to the
electoral and judiciary systems. This failure helps explain Colombia’s massive public protests
occurring since November of 2019. 32 This dissatisfaction with the executive branch has also
contributed to judicialization.
While the National Development Plan offers a great start for Colombia, the judicial
branch remains in need of serious reform to ensure PND’s overall goal of a more efficient and
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just state will succeed. In fact, the government’s failure to implement its promises for improved
political institutions may lead to another La Violencía, especially as public dissatisfaction
continues to surge.33 Hence, I conclude Colombia’s government should implement a plan that
would focus specifically on the judicial branch and would offer detailed, goal-oriented reforms to
bring about this desired measurable and positive change.

IX. Current Judicial Problems and Structure

A. Inefficient Justice Administration and Low Public Confidence
Among the numerous problems facing the judiciary, the process of securing justice in
Colombia is painfully slow. Judicial understaffing has led to heavy and backlogged caseloads.
The number of judges per 100,000 people in Colombia is 0.5, which falls well below other Latin
American countries, including Brazil (1.0), Peru (1.0), and Panama (2.6).34 In fact, the World
Bank estimates it takes almost four years, on average, to enforce a simple contract. The actual
amount of time it takes for a case to be resolved exceeds given time restrictions by 200 percent.35
Moreover, the process in Colombia is very expensive. The cost of litigation as a percentage of
the claim, at 41%, is substantially higher than the Latin American average.36 Although the
Constitutional Court and the introduction of the tutela were designed to increase access to
justice, unforeseen implications remain a problem to be addressed.
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Public confidence in Colombia’s judicial system also ranks very low among the states of
Latin America. In a recent opinion survey, only 23% of respondents said they trusted the judicial
branch, while 39% said they simply had no confidence in it all.37 Another poll showed that 89%
of all Colombians surveyed believed that judges were corrupt and did not apply the law
evenhandedly.38 Despite these disconcerting numbers, the judicial system in Colombia is still
generally viewed more positively than the other two branches of government. Nevertheless, the
judicial system is overloaded, underfunded, and understaffed, while judges and other judicial
personnel are undertrained and inefficient.

B. The Courts
Considering the past reforms, what exactly does the Colombian judiciary look like today?
The judicial branch currently consists of four distinct jurisdictions: the ordinary, administrative,
constitutional, and special jurisdictions. The highest judicial organs are now the Supreme Court,
the Council of State, the Superior Council of the Judicature, and the Constitutional Court. The
Supreme Court, divided into two chambers, is technically the highest court regarding ordinary
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court's chambers, each with separate jurisdictions, decide which cases
are to be heard by its full court. The court can also technically draft its own rules of procedure
and can exercise the power of judicial review. Judicial review is the authority to decide if the
legislative and executive branches' actions are valid.39 The Council of State, divided into separate
chambers, is also tasked with the authority of judicial review, to act as a supreme consultative
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body of the government in matters of war or national security, to present proposals to amend the
Constitution and other bills, and to make its own by-laws. It is more an administrative entity than
a fully functioning court.
The Superior Council of the Judicature is divided into two chambers. The first is an
administrative chamber consisting of six elected judges. Two members are elected by the
Supreme Court, one by the Constitutional Court, and three by the Council of State. The second is
a jurisdictional disciplinary chamber made up of seven members elected by the National
Congress. This Council is in charge of disciplinary and administrative matters such as human
resources, operations, and finance. It also has the power to draw up lists of judicial candidates for
appointment to any of these specific judicial entities. Indeed, this is a powerful entity. Moreover,
the Superior Council has the power to examine and sanction errors of judicial officials and
lawyers, to settle jurisdictional conflicts between the differing judicial organs, and to oversee the
productivity of the judicial bodies.40
Finally, the Constitutional Court is entrusted to safeguard the integrity and supremacy of
the Constitution. The members of this court are elected by the Senate of the Republic and are
ineligible for reelection. Its most important function is its ability to take up petitions of
unconstitutionality brought by citizens and to decide the constitutionality of calls of the Council
of State to amend the Constitution, national laws, and bills opposed by the government. It can
also approve international treaties, review judicial decisions connected with the protection of
constitutional rights, and draft its own by-laws.41
This complex structure with clearly overlapping responsibilities and jurisdictions
produces contentious turf wars and bitter disagreements. In fact, these internal disputes take up
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judicial attention than the human-rights issues that this structure is supposed to address. The four
organs often ignore the opinions of one another, as they often hold different interpretations of the
law. The tutela, in particular, is the source of the most common clashes among the courts.42 For
example, a tutela may bring a claim before the Constitutional Court that a Supreme Court
decision is unconstitutional and must be struck down. Note that a Supreme Court decision
follows two rounds of litigation already conducted in the trial and appellate courts. If the losing
party disagrees with the Supreme Court decision, it now has another chance to claim a favorable
judgment. Hence, the Constitutional Court has become the fallback or default court, if every
other appeal fails. Importantly, both the Supreme and Constitutional Court claim binding
decision-making authority. It is clear that the disagreement between the courts regarding proper
interpretations of the law and constitutional jurisdiction stems from the overlapping
responsibilities granted by the Constitution.43 A careful reading reveals serious contradictions
that must be addressed. There is also a glaring gap between the written Constitution and its
application. Judges who are supposed to be independent regularly face significant pressure to
adhere to the desires of the other branches, despite the Constitution granting the Courts
autonomy and judicial review.

C. The Bifurcated System
Following the French civil law model, Colombia has a bifurcated judicial system. The
Supreme Court presides over all private law, which consists of civil and criminal matters. Within
private law, the civil and criminal spheres of judicial proceedings are entirely separate from one
another. The primary differences between civil and criminal cases concern the role of the judge.
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In a civil law system, as opposed to the American common-law system, it is very difficult for a
citizen to bring a civil case before the courts. The Colombian civil-law system, therefore,
provides very few resources of legal services. The process, expensive and inaccessible, also
offers little direct contact between the judges and the parties during the process. Court hearings
remain private, and decisions are made with a limited direct role of the parties involved. In the
case of a criminal proceeding, judges conduct the entire investigation on their own by employing
their own judicial police and making a decision before the defendant ever appears in court. In
this sense, the Colombian system is inquisitorial, since the judge serves as the investigator,
prosecutor, and adjudicator simultaneously. The defendant has little ability to confront evidence
presented against him or her, and there is no impartial third-party to provide lawful due
process.44
The Council of State, however, presides over public or administrative law, which
regulates the operation and procedures of government agencies. The Council plays an important
role in the appointment and replacement of judicial actors within the other high-ranking judicial
organs. While most of the abuse of power and official corruption stems from government
agencies, past reforms have not addressed the Council’s authority, transparency, or degree of
oversight. The Council may hold too much authority, making the impact of its decisions
susceptible to ulterior motives. For example, in 2011, the Council made a landmark decision by
interpreting a new meaning of the Constitution. The Constitution previously held that a nominee
for the position of Chief Prosecutor of the Supreme Court needed votes from two-thirds of the
Supreme Court to be selected. This allowed Viviane Morales to fill the position, who then

aggressively prosecuted the corrupted allies of the former right-wing president, Álvaro Uríbe.
However, the Council of State’s decision has since removed her from office, as it concluded that
her selection process was unconstitutional. The decision’s implications have thwarted the
president’s agenda to weaken the influence of former, corrupted political figures.45 Why would
the Council decide this? It is possible it was simply fulfilling its duty. However, it is important to
remember the members of the Council are elected by the National Congress. It is quite possible
that this decision, and perhaps others, were made with a strategic goal to maintain corrupted
political influence. It would follow from this conclusion that greater accountability measures are
in order.

X. Analysis

Colombia's ongoing struggle to establish transparent democratic governance has caught
the attention of many scholars who have provided a variety of theories seeking to explain the
country's crisis. As a democratic republic, power and authority should be derived from the
people.46 Elected officials should serve the people who elect them, work to protect rights, and
value the enforcement of laws. This is clearly not the case in Colombia. Most of the reforms that
have taken place in Colombia since the early 1990s have empowered the judiciary. Bruce M.
Wilson asserts that the failure of Colombia’s democracy has prompted this empowerment – the
judicialization of Colombia – and has resulted in a change in the behavior of the country’s
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highest court. This “rights revolution,” as Wilson labels it, has resulted in the court’s shying
away from contract-related cases and other disputes in favor of routinely prioritizing the
protection of individual rights. This has meant that traditionally marginalized people have been
able to present their claims for constitutionally guaranteed rights and be heard.47 This has also
meant, however, that other important disputes have been pushed aside. Thus, the court is
fulfilling only part of its total responsibility. Wilson has argued any potential reform project
would require the formation of watch-dog organizations to provide support structures and
external oversight of the judicial branch.48 In America, such support structures take the form of
reputable organizations like the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). Felipe García similarly
asserts that the judiciary requires the introduction of new exogenous bodies to monitor judicial
functions. Third-party oversight and enforcement are crucial to the institutional structure of
successful democratic societies.49 Both Wilson and García are referring to the need for an active,
engaged civil society that monitors the behavior of judges and other officials, publicizes and
openly criticizes inappropriate behavior, and serves as the eyes and ears of a society focused on
developing transparent, effective political and judicial institutions.
Joris Tielens has argued that Colombia’s judicial reforms have actually been quite
limited. He contends that, despite Colombia’s effort to democratize, the country’s political
system remains far from democratic. Democracy, he asserts, must be accountable, tolerant,
diverse, and inclusive. It must protect the rights of all citizens. Its politicians and political
institutions must respond to the needs of the population and must be held accountable if they do
not. Colombia, in Tielens’s view, has far to go before it can claim to be a legitimate democratic
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government with a strong and independent judiciary. The country’s current state of affairs is so
unstable that such an outcome could never occur “overnight.”50
Nagle offers a different, and even more negative, interpretation. She believes the lack of
political stability has been used to justify superficial judicial reforms. To her, Colombia’s
judicial reforms have served as a distraction from the other more serious problems confronting
the country, including poverty and persistent violence. In an effort to court U.S. foreign
assistance, Colombia has pushed forward with an array of judicial reforms to win U.S. support,
but these have failed to directly address the country’s most pressing problems. Consequently, the
reforms within the judiciary have only been an extension of the corruption that plagues the entire
political system. Nagle contends that the judicial branch supports reforms because it brings
additional funding and more independence. As a result, the branch fails to address fundamental
problems. In sum, she believes judicialization is nothing more than the elite political class
continuing to manipulate representative democracy to serve its own interests and to starve
citizens of genuine and substantive change.51

XI. Obstacles Confronting Colombia’s Attempts to Reform

Scholars broadly agree on the central obstacles confronting Colombia’s efforts at judicial
and political reforms. Nagle has argued that the judiciary is no more inclined to reform itself than
any other institution in Colombia. The judiciary has long benefited from the status quo and is
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therefore unwilling to consider reform.52 Indeed, Nagle points to culture as the most serious
obstacle. The higher courts have historically commanded little respect from the other branches or
the citizens. Colombian courts, like the courts in so many other Latin American countries, have
traditionally "rubber-stamped" the executive's actions by finding constitutional justification for
them. This has demonstrated a clear lack of judicial will to interfere in law-making procedures
and has provided executives freewill to dominate Colombia’s politics as they please. Although
the governmental reforms initiated in the early 1990s assigned the judicial branch the
responsibility to bring about democratization, transparency, and the protection of human rights,
the judiciary has refused to step up and carry out this task.53 Instead, it has minimized its own
power by allowing political elites to bribe judges to ensure favorable outcomes of distributive
decisions or to enhance political advantages. Therefore, the judiciary has put its own selfpreservation above its democratization obligations.54
Indeed, the judiciary has adopted a defensive and reactive response to change and an
unwillingness to carry out the kinds of responsibilities envisioned for it in the Constitution.
García has argued that judges have grown comfortable with their arrangement with the political
elite and subsequently view demands for change as threats to their security, rather than as
opportunities for political and social development. Moreover, judges have creative recalcitrant
patterns of resistance and have rejected the modern blueprint put before them. Rather, they have
clung to performing their traditional tasks. This behavior clearly reflects the organizational
patterns inherited from the colonial period and long-enduring institutional instability. The
judiciary clearly desires to protect its traditional role and its security. Consequently, its
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popularity and legitimacy among Colombian citizens have suffered.55 This resistance suggests
the need for added pressure from outside of the judicial organization is at this point, hard to
envision.
Judicial unresponsiveness clearly must be accounted for when creating a plan for
substantive change. According to García, the informal constraints embodied in traditions and
culture are almost always more resistant to change than formal policies or rules. This explains
why the introduction of the Constitutional Court serves only as a partial solution to the deeperrooted inefficiencies of the courts. While it offered a convenient path to access justice for
Colombian citizens, it failed to address the defensive or reactive nature of the judiciary as a
whole. By introducing a court high enough to challenge the long-standing authority of the
Supreme Court, it makes sense why the two judicial bodies cannot see eye-to-eye regarding
Constitutional interpretation. On one hand, the new Constitutional Court judges seek to liberate
the people and provide a remedy for their grievances. Both its focus and its authority vis-à-vis
the rest of the judiciary create internal tensions that have destructive potential.
Plan Colombia offered another attempt at judicial reform, but it too fell far short for
several reasons. First, the plan failed to consider its impact on the region and the geopolitical
threats imposed on Colombia’s neighbors. The United States Agency for International
Development (USAID)-sponsored judicial reform was viewed by neighboring states as a tool to
advance a U.S. foreign-policy agenda, in addition to a rule-of-law program. While this view may
have been overly simplified and discounted the positive aspects of the program, the U.S. indeed
funded a strengthening of the country's courts with an intent to more effectively prosecute drug
lords.56 Note that Colombia’s laws do not allow it to extradite Colombian nationals. Many

55
56

García, “Nature of Judicial Reform in Latin America,” 1286-1288.
Nagle, “The Search for Accountability and Transparency in Plan Colombia,” 27-33.

Colombian traffickers who had been arrested in Colombia and indicted in U.S. courts, had to be
tried in Colombian courts, which had a less than impressive conviction rate. So, while improving
the administration of justice in Latin America has long been a critically important goal of
USAID, Plan Colombia has a drug-trafficking component that tainted, in part, the American
effort.
Along with the judicial reforms, Plan Colombia offered military support and institutional
strengthening as part of a regional effort to bring down the cartels. In return for U.S. assistance,
Colombia, along with Argentina, Honduras, and other Latin American countries, diplomatically
supported the 1999 U.S.-led United Nations invasion of Kuwait to repel Iraq’s aggression.
Colombia’s neighbors, especially Ecuador, which the Colombian government had accused of
harboring FARC insurgents, viewed Plan Colombia as a threat because of its effort to strengthen
the Colombian military.57 Finally, while the Colombian government managed to bring down the
Colombian cartels and the level of drug-related violence, the root problem of a weak, ineffectual,
and corrupt government with little interest in ensuring the fair and equitable administration of
justice has remained a central problem. To make matters worse, Plan Colombia failed to clearly
identify its broader objectives regarding judicial reforms. Consequently, the funding supported
spending increases within the judicial branch but resulted in limited real or measurable
improvements in the administration of justice. It is evident any future reform must learn from
Plan Colombia’s mistakes.
The numerous obstacles confronting Colombia raise a central question: what now? How
does a system reform itself if those in charge are comfortable with the power that they wield vis-
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à-vis the citizens? The country has endured external pressure from international and regional
organizations, foreign governments, and legal experts. Yet, its reforms have been superficial,
confusing, and have in many instances, created more problems than they have solved. Clearly,
Colombia needs a far-reaching, comprehensive round of serious judicial reforms.

XII. So, What Does the Colombian Judicial Branch Need?

In the final section of this paper, drawing from Colombian newspapers, think-tank
reports, survey research, and academic studies, I will outline a comprehensive reform proposal to
potentially reform Colombia’s judiciary. There are a few important considerations to address.
First, future reforms mustn't be subject to a "sub-category" of a larger agenda. History shows that
overly broad plans with multiple-tiered agendas fail to allocate enough attention to
judicialization. Note that judicialization places the judiciary at the center of the political process
and provides it with the authority and oversight necessary to act in the interest of the country as a
whole.58 Second, the proposed agenda should also deal with most of the institutional and
organizational elements that determine a coherent judicial performance synchronously. The
change will likely require a combination of modifications mainly from within the judiciary's
institutional and organizational structure. Most importantly, the strategy will be feasible only if
Colombia's government develops a broad consensus about the specific reform agenda. Potential
opposition from the incumbent leadership should be expected and planned for accordingly.
Third, compromise will be essential in the government’s effort to create a working consensus.
The constituents, who will ultimately judge the legitimacy and transparency of the judicial
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branch, must also agree with this consensus. Scholars have suggested that a phased reform
process may be the key to smoothly transitioning Colombia and to developing such a
consensus.59
In sum, the judicial-reform plan should address three major criteria: financial
sustainability, judicial competence, and judicial accountability.60 Also, its overarching goals
should be two-fold, addressing responsiveness and trust. The first overarching objective is to
establish greater judicial effectiveness regarding its principal functions including the guarantee
of administration of justice and dispute resolution.61 The second objective is to establish
sufficient judicial trustworthiness and responsiveness to the demands of society. This will
include opening itself to scrutiny and citizen participation, so it can adhere to society’s values,
rather than its own.
Judicial reform projects are generally oriented in procedural and administrative terms.62
I will follow this pattern. Procedural reforms target issues of judicial efficiency and
effectiveness.63 Thus, procedural reforms focus on the first objective of judicial effectiveness,
including the necessary improvements of judicial competence and accountability, as well as the
financial sustainability necessary for the plan. Administrative reforms target improvements to
public life, such as eliminating corruption, increasing representativeness, and fostering the
participation of citizens and citizen groups.64 Therefore, administrative reforms target our second
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objective to enhance judicial trustworthiness and responsiveness. It is essential to address
objective number one first, as legitimacy and trust can only follow from a sufficient judicial
performance.
While pursuing the two primary objectives, the proposal should be strategically
implemented in phases. The first phase of the process should properly allocate the funding
necessary to carry the plan out. Here, it is important to address the financial burdens placed on
potential reform, especially the economic conditionality entrapment with the U.S. The second
phase should address overall judicial competence. Improvement to areas such as case
management, personnel training and staffing, and education may prove to benefit the judiciary’s
efficiency and effectiveness. The third phase should focus on changes aimed at increasing the
degree of responsiveness and accountability of the judicial governance structure to the needs of
an increasing modem and democratic society. Note the recent protests make it clear that the
Colombian public seeks improved transparency and functionality from its judiciary. It follows
that allowing the public to participate in the later stages of the process will be essential.
However, it is critical to first ensure the people will be safe while participating in judicial
proceedings, especially considering the history of bribes and threats to judicial actors. Hence, it
may take years before the final phase, as suggested, can be realistically implemented, because
improving judicial competence and accountability to an acceptable level will take time.

A. Financial Sustainability
First and foremost, the plan proposed in this paper will likely carry a hefty price tag. It is
well known the U.S. has a history of creating incentives in Latin America to strengthen the
region’s rule of law, to support market economies, and to encourage representative democratic

governments. It follows that the U.S. government has financially supported several of
Colombia’s previous reforms. Many U.S.-funded programs, however, including Plan Colombia,
went far beyond judicial reforms and prioritized other agendas. Now, I acknowledge that foreign
assistance could help provide critically important funding for the following phases of reform. If
possible though, Colombia should try to avoid wholly depending on other sources of assistance
and instead allocate a reasonable portion of its own budget to these objectives. This would be a
wise far-reaching investment for the country, both in support of its own democratic development
and for greater economic and political stability. If this is not possible, an alternative option might
be for the country to develop private-public programs that draw on the expertise and resources of
private-sector organizations, legal experts, and scholars, combined with public-sector civil
servants and occasionally, foreign experts.

B. Competence
Once a financial plan is in order, the internal workings of the judiciary could benefit from
thorough adjustment. It is important to first consider the judiciary in Colombia has never been
considered to be an equal branch of the government. This has limited the branch’s capacity to
function independently, as the Constitution intended. We should first determine where current
judicial actors lack regarding competence to remedy this discrepancy. First, the Colombian
judiciary has little to no ability to investigate a crime in a professional, forthright, or accountable
manner. Second, judges have little to no education or training required to accomplish their jobs
effectively. Third, they are not required to undertake meticulous background checks before being
hired. Since judges lack professionalism, they tend to be more receptive to bribery and
intimidation.65
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To initiate necessary change, I suggest intensive re-training of the current judicial actors.
It is also essential to train aspiring judicial actors before they can take office. As the current
members retire, these new and more qualified actors will replace their predecessors. Through
continuous replacement, the branch could eventually "turn over a new leaf," and thus function
more effectively as a whole. Hence, Colombia should establish a national academy designed to
train aspiring judges, judicial police, prosecutors, and investigative units immediately after
college. The training academy regimen would likely instill discipline and establish a common
loyalty, at least among its aspiring judicial actors. It would also provide overarching
cohesiveness and consistency throughout the system, and therefore grant less opportunity for
personal gain.66 The academy should also increase service requirements to ensure only the most
qualified individuals are eligible to rise to such positions of power. USAID has long funded such
programs in Latin America, with varying levels of success. Perhaps, a country with a civil-law,
rather than a common-law system, could help fund the judicial academies and employ its own
professionals to train Colombian actors. Since the contributing country would understand civil
law procedures, its input may be more compatible with Colombia’s judicial system than
programs from the United States. For example, Switzerland, a civil-law country, has led 17 Latin
American countries’ judicial academies since 2004. The course is considered very successful, as
it promotes improved justice administration services and judicial training activities.67
To advance the judiciary’s competency further, improving its access to justice and
dispute resolution is critical. Since the 2012 reform-attempt, Colombia has made notable
progress in improving its access to justice. The 2015 Justice Service Strengthening Project
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(JSSP) has advanced legal reforms with a primary focus on transitioning the judiciary from a
written to an oral court system. The new system has streamlined previously time-consuming
written communications into a single court hearing and consequently reduced the number of
backlogged cases across the system. JSSP has also expanded access to justice for groups of
society who previously struggled to utilize dispute-resolution services. It also plans to combine
its numerous reforms into a “unified management model,” consolidating different court systems
through a centralized database.68 Though the Justice Service Strengthening Project has reduced
judicial congestion and introduced alternate dispute mechanisms, reform has only targeted major
cities. As a result, its positive outcomes have yet to make an impact on more isolated areas. I
recommend that new reform builds upon the progress made in cities to eventually expand to
every court across Colombia. Divided by region, centralized information centers and courts
could be led by judicial actors who have graduated from the training academy.
Importantly, I recognize it will take many years before all of the current judicial actors
will retire, allowing the newly trained actors to take their place. There is no also guarantee the
first-generation removed will be immune to the same faults as their predecessors. Hence,
potentially effective reform should continue to restructure the judicial system itself to address
deeper-rooted inefficiencies. Scholars have found the bifurcated structure of Colombia’s highest
courts harms the judiciary’s effectiveness and efficiency at the most fundamental level.69 The
Supreme Court currently presides over civil and criminal matters, while the Council of State
presides over the public or administrative law. Additionally, the tutela remedy within the
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Constitutional Court specifically allows the Supreme Court's ruling to be rejected. This lack of a
clear hierarchical order among the three highest courts fails to establish one court with supreme
authority. Therefore, a critical adjustment is in order.
Below the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, numerous appellate and district courts
currently function similarly to the thirteen U.S. Court of Appeals System. A court of appeals
hears challenges to district court decisions within its circuit, as well as appeals from the decisions
of federal administrative agencies.70 I suggest that more appellate and district courts be
implemented to take priority hearing all local and regional cases. This would leave only federallevel cases to the highest courts. While non-federal cases may occasionally reach the Supreme
Court, this should occur significantly less often than it does in the current structure.
Although, another provision is needed to address the hierarchical confusion between the
Supreme and Constitutional Courts. I suggest Colombia keep the Constitutional Court intact. It
has already established a trustworthy reputation among Colombian citizens and successfully
administers individual constitutional protections. The tutela provision itself, however, should be
refined. The Constitutional Court should not serve as a “higher” authority to the Supreme Court
with the ability to overrule its prior decisions via the tutela. Rather, only constitutionaljurisdiction decisions made in lower appellate courts should be subject to additional appeal to be
heard by the Constitutional Court. The two courts should then never hear each other’s cases, as
they would only hear cases within their distinct jurisdictions. The provision should also allow the
courts to be less subject to over-rulings from the other. They would also benefit from smaller
caseloads, as the new lower courts in each jurisdiction would make the less-impactful decisions
on a day-to-day basis.
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C. Accountability
Reform must also take into serious consideration the current lack of accountability among
the courts. First, courts should not be allowed to continue to oversee themselves and to create
their own rules of procedure. The current system of granting each court such autonomy means
that judges can bend their interpretation of the law as they see fit. Instead, general rules of
procedure should be created and ideally enforced independently of the judges themselves.71
However, scholars struggle to identify a political body that could best enforce such procedures.
As of right now, this question remains. What is known, however, is that to entrust any of the
courts to make lawful and just decisions, the plan must, in García's words, minimize the "enclave
and autocratic nature of the current judicial leadership." 72
Some scholars have suggested that serious consideration should be given to the selection
of court justices to accomplish this. Doing so could allow judges to acquire greater levels of
political legitimacy and the people’s trust. This recommendation presents the perfect opportunity
to provide civil society the participation it desires. Judges in Colombia, however, have strongly
resisted any diminishing of their autonomy and have not welcomed civil-society input.73
Scholars generally recognize the defensive tendencies of Colombian judges when it comes to
introducing change, as well as their autocratic desire to retain power and autonomy. We can
thereby conclude that any changes to the judiciary's structure and its operational policies must
carefully balance the judiciary’s autonomy with its accountability vis-à-vis civil society.74
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Recall the Superior Council can create lists of judicial candidates for a specific judicial
entity, including the other highest courts. Hence, it makes sense that judges and congressional
members often nominate their political allies to the Superior Council. This then allows further
abuse of power to endure. So, there must be changes to the discretionary nature of the
appointment process to mitigate the inbreeding within the judicial bureaucracy.75 I assert the
Superior Council’s responsibility to uphold the proposed rules of procedures can only be fulfilled
if its nomination process is left to a wholly independent actor. Ideally, the president, who is often
elected by the people and is potentially less corrupt, would select the members of this body.
However, Colombian presidents are not immune to potential misconduct and should not be
trusted to carry out this role. A better option might be to entrust the nomination process to the
people.76 Of course, that presents additional problems.
If the selection of the Superior Council’s members were to be entrusted to civil society,
this would remedy the fact that civil-society participation in Colombia’s justice administration
falls well below that of most other developing countries. Civil society has historically played no
role in contributing to the administration of justice in Colombia, as its civil-law system does not
have juries or elected judges. To include the people in this selection process, the Superior
Council’s nominees should be considered exclusively based on merit with prevalent civil
organizations’ (CSOs) input.77 The CSOs would be in charge of finding and providing evidence
for or against potential judges and would then put forward potential members. The nominees
would have to be vetted in some fashion, before eventually being placed before the public for a
vote. Then, the people could choose accordingly. Once an election has taken place, the nominees
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with a majority of the votes will proceed to take office. This new selection process would also
help society learn to trust the judiciary, as judges will be inclined to act more ethically to meet
societal expectations.
The next step to increase judicial accountability is to modify the current watchdog
judicial organ. This modified watchdog organ would oversee the new general rules of judicial
procedure. I suggest the newly modified Superior Council of the Judicature. This body, wholly
within the judiciary, already supervises the courts and could take on an expanded role. Recall the
Council already examines and sanctions errors of judicial officials and lawyers, settles
jurisdictional conflicts among the differing judicial organs, and oversees the productivity of the
judicial bodies. Hence, the Council’s modification would allow it to carry out its functions in a
more forthright manner. However, some scholars have suggested civil organizations should
instead monitor judicial decisions and serve as watchdogs. While entrusting exogenous bodies to
oversee the judiciary sounds ideal, this has proven to fail in other Latin American countries.
These administrative bodies have often proven to be ineffective and unable to ensure
administrative efficiency and accountability. They instead tend to pose an additional disruptive
component to the already-weak justice-oversight function.78 Further, entrusting the oversight
function to a non-judiciary body is not ideal given the lengthy past of judicial subordination.
However, there are other ways to implement necessary civil society participation in
Colombia. The country could benefit from allowing society to gain insight into the general
proceedings of the courts at every level. To accomplish this, the judiciary must first open itself to
greater scrutiny from the news media to monitor its proceedings and conduct. Opening judicial
proceedings to greater scrutiny would force acting judges to adhere to the public’s opinion and
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make it harder to manipulate the system for their personal benefit. Second, a specific code of
personal and professional conduct for judges should be introduced by the new Superior Council.
Specific sanctions should then be established and enforced to monitor behavior, to ensure the
proper enforcement of rules, and to ensure that all judges expedite the court's case-hearing
process effectively.79 Sanctions could range from a simple warning, potentially harming their reelection candidacy, to removal from office.
Of course, these reforms would create a series of new challenges. It is difficult to predict
how engaged citizens would become, the extent to which they would investigate the record of the
judicial nominees, the transparency of CSOs, and the overall feasibility of this rather drawn-out
process. Outside of recent protests, the Colombian citizenry does not have a record of extensive
active civil-society engagement. This kind of behavioral change would require a fundamental
change in values and attitudes toward both the judiciary and the relationship between citizens
and the state. These reforms could thus be tested on a local or “pilot” court, to measure
feasibility before expanding to all courts.
Moreover, society cannot gain sufficient insight into the courts unless the clash between
how the judiciary attempts to enforce the law and how the people view the law is remedied. A
modern democracy’s norms often assume the people understand democratic principles and thus
submit to live under its single rule of law. However, Colombia currently possesses two rules of
law: the unofficial vigilante law remaining from FARC and the official law of the land. The
government has historically neglected its responsibility to educate its citizens about their rights
and how the democratic-republic system operates. This neglect is partially to blame for the

79

Nagle, “The Search for Accountability and Transparency in Plan Colombia,” 23-25.

citizen’s lack of trust towards the judicial system, as there is a clear disconnect between the
judicial decision-making process and how the decisions are justified to society.80
Though the government has established a few user-information offices in larger cities to
disseminate justice-sector standards, this service remains very limited. The lack of trust in the
courts should be addressed across the entire nation, especially considering its role in the
prominence of judicial vigilantism. Vigilantes are paramilitary groups who take their region’s
law into their own hands. The people in rural areas especially have come to accept vigilantism,
because their only other option is to wait for months or years for the courts to provide legal
services.81 The Colombian state has come to unofficially accept these alternative legal processes
as semi-legitimate. However, if the proposed reform were to prioritize judicial outreach and
public education, the judiciary could potentially regain the people's trust and thereby reduce their
dependency on vigilante administration of justice. If vigilante law's legitimacy is eliminated,
then the law of the land could finally rule.
Then, once the people learn of the system, they will expect it to function as designed. The
following reforms could eventually be implemented across all courts to garner more of the
public’s trust. First, lay-citizen juries might be introduced into judicial proceedings. Because of
the civil-law nature of the Colombian judicial system, this would require some alterations to the
process. But in modern common-law democracies, juries hear evidence, listen to both parties'
arguments, and decide whether the court established beyond reasonable doubt for criminal cases
or on the balance of probability for civil cases.82 Juries are essential to democracy because they
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provide an unbiased, impartial perspective derived from the people. Accordingly, decisionmaking is decentralized and made by a group, rather than a single official. Other Latin American
civil-law systems, including that of Mexico, have introduced the partial use of juries, and the
results have been positive.83 Further, juries reflect the notion of justice held by ordinary citizens
and thus constitute a key connection between the judiciary and civil society. Second, there is a
lack of personal contact between judges and the parties during the judicial process. This largely
contributes to the lack of fair judicial treatment towards the disadvantaged, especially in civil
matters. Providing adequate direct contact would provide judges with a first-hand understanding
of the reality of a case, rather than seeing it through the constrained lenses of a written
presentation. Third, the high level of discretion in the management of the criminal process should
be resolved. Courts should establish overarching reporting duties, so the judges have to inform
the public of their investigative progress as the case proceeds.84 This will also serve civil
society’s desire for additional transparency.

XIII. Conclusion

Despite its uphill battle to reverse centuries of judicial subordination, Colombia has made
significant strides towards creating a judicial branch capable of protecting individual rights.
Fortunately, the Colombian people see hope in such reforms, especially the Constitutional Court.
Yet, the people have become discontent with their leadership’s failures. They have realized the
importance of strengthening judicial institutions and have put pressure on elected leaders to
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make rapid, substantive progress. Learning from previous reforms’ mistakes, Colombia’s
leadership has plenty of information to work with. However, it is important for future reforms to
address the root of the judiciary’s problems, to formulate a specific judicial-focused plan, and to
carry it out in distinct phases. Colombia must also carefully address the financial sustainability of
such a plan and invest heavily in improving judicial competence and accountability. While it is
unreasonable to assume this plan could remedy all of Colombia’s judicial branch’s weaknesses
right away, perhaps some of the suggestions listed could lead to a step in the right direction.
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